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The Relationship between Online and Offline Participation in a Social Movement

Gezi Park Protests in the Diaspora

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Although the Zapatista and the anti-globalization protests are for some perhaps only a dim memory in our discussions of social movements today, they do provide the historical beginnings of the use of computer- based networks to organize and participate in social movements. They also provide a platform for an ongoing discussion of the role played by such networks in staging protests. In a constantly evolving Internet environment we still ask if a social movement can exist exclusively online or whether it also requires people to appear in the streets. Can a social movement be controlled from an online base? Does leadership of a social movement emerge from the online activity or does that only happen through face-to-face contact in meetings? Although we cannot answer all of those questions in our study, we do analyze the relationship between online and offline participation in one case.

The social movement we chose to explore in terms of its online and offline components and their relationship is the Gezi Park protests that began in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2013. This movement is important to examine as it represents an unprecedented massive outcry against the repressive policies of the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, largely from people from different walks of life who may talk politics

within their closed circles but who rarely express their grievances publicly. Those who took to the streets bravely confronted police armed with water cannons and gas bombs because they felt they had been disenfranchised by the government that was democratically elected, but which viewed its majority status as a mandate to impose its values and policies on the people without consideration for any minority views. The Erdoğan-led government ran roughshod over human rights and denied free speech to both the press and any individuals who voiced criticisms. Though the demonstrations that sought to defeat the authoritarian tactics of Erdoğan's government were visibly short-lived, quelled by the exces- sive use of force, the movement lives on in forums and smaller demon- strations and remembrance-of-the-slain marches. It has also retreated to online spaces given the threat of violent reactions from the police force and the refusals by the government to grant official permission to street demonstrations.

Over time two major theoretical paradigma, new social movement (NSM) theory and resource mobilization (RM) theory, have been developed to address the rise of a range of social movements. Originally these theories appeared to be incompatible—one arising from a European tradition and the other from a North American perspective (Canel, 1997).

> NSM theory, for instance, questions reductionist Marxism, which assigned the working class a privileged place in the unfolding of history. RM theory, in contrast, criticizes Durkheim's view of collective action as anomic and irrational behavior resulting from rapid social change, and it questions 'relative deprivation' theory, which assumes a direct link between perceived deprivation and collective action. (p. 189)

Canel argued that the two approaches should be integrated into a third approach that called on elements of both theories to form a new theory that minimized the deficiencies of both approaches. To this day, this integration has not taken place. Rather, as Klandermans and Roggeband point out in their introduction to the *Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines*, theories have continued to proliferate according to their disciplinary homes (political science, sociology, social psychology, etc.), the geographies of the movements, their historical bases and their thematic nature (2007).

While the focus of this research does not permit an extensive explication of the concept, we do not mean to minimize the importance of doing this. We draw on several scholars' work when we describe social movements more generally, however. And our particular focus is on comparisons between online and offline collective action in the Gezi movement, so we tend to draw on literature related to the role of the Internet in social movement formation and participation. Nevertheless, we are aware that activists use and produce a genuine mix of offline and online media as sources of information and tools to communicate and broadcast them-

selves so as to enable their resistance (Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy, 2013; Rucht, 2004). Furthermore, we recognize that media and communication scholars tend to be overly media-centric, and that there is a small presence of media and communication practices in the vast literature on social movements. With this study we intend to remedy this typical divorce (Koopmans, 2004).

According to several contemporary scholars, a social movement requires the following four characteristics: "(1) a network of organizations, (2) on the basis of shared collective identity, (3) mobilizing people to join mostly unconventional actions, and (4) to obtain social or political goals" (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004, 88, citing Duyvendak and Koopmans, 1992; Diani and Eyerman, 1992) **[AU: add to ref. list]**. In the case of the Gezi protests, disparate organizations (from football clubs to minority political parties, from communists and anarchists to nationalists, from Muslims to LGBTs) with the shared identity of standing in opposition to the prime minister and his party's policies, joined together to speak to power in the form of their prime minister. From a political economy perspective, they were united around the following issues: protesting against the neoliberal agenda under the AKP rule, which led the country into a jobless growth pattern; opposing the commodification of labour and the degradation of the environment, which is considered as an inevi- table price to be paid for economic growth; and also opposing the blatant concessions to the construction industry, one of the backbones of AKP's strategy (Civelekoğlu, 2015). However, in the aftermath of these demonstrations in Turkey, would-be street protestors have struggled to maintain a focus on those characteristics through blogs, alternative online media, Twitter messages and Facebook pages. Taking the square again has been limited by the threat of prosecution, the fear for personal safety, and new legislation that permits the cancellation of any meeting or demonstration that is believed to pose a risk to public order ('Turkey's New Draconian Measures, 2015, August 7).

We view the Gezi Park movement from three countries in Europe where the Turkish diaspora has taken root. Most studies of protests concentrate on the actual participants in the demonstrations taking place in the streets of the country where the dissatisfaction is based. This study focuses rather on those members of the diaspora who reside in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Many of these people were born in Turkey and migrated to one of these European countries, while others represent second or even third generation Turkish minorities whose only personal contact with Turkey may have been through vacations or family visits. We are therefore interested in the reasons for making strong connections to these demonstrations that would have limited effect on their daily lives. We asked ourselves how the solidarity with the Gezi spirit was diffused in synchrony throughout Europe. In agreement with the posi- tion of Bahar Baser (2015), we believe that while the above-mentioned

motivations by the demonstrators in Turkey have little to do with the daily diasporic lives of European Turkish minorities, there are clear rea- sons for those living in Europe to feel the Gezi spirit and empathize with the protestors in Turkey. Some minorities are the descendants of the Kemalist movement; others were members of leftist associations; still oth- ers practice the Alevi form of Islam; while many are of Kurdish origin. Many of these minorities took refuge in Europe in the 1970s from repres- sive governments in Turkey during that time. Moreover, in European countries where demonstrations in public places are legal and protected, the protestors have been better able to organize both online and offline activities as their repertoires of resistance and alliance with their compatriots in Turkey.

STUDIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE INTERNET

Early questions of the relationship between online and offline involvement in a social movement were raised when the Internet was in its infancy—and online interactive participation was possible only through list-servs, bulletin boards (such as Usenet) and Internet forums. Not until 2002 with the advent of Friendster did social media begin to take the form that is more like what we know today as social networks. The more developed affordances of Web 2.0 allowed users to connect with far-flung individuals and groups more directly and sophisticatedly, thus providing the structure for these media to play important roles in social movements. This structure is especially useful for movements like the one we focus on in this study where members of the diaspora can participate virtually in the demonstrations in Turkey, and develop a network in Europe to participate both online and in public spaces where they live.

In the Zapatista movement, which began in Chiapas, Mexico, as a response to NAFTA, Marcos, leader of the National Liberation Army in Mexico (EZLN) made excellent use of the early Internet to mobilize support from NGOs, the media, and individuals and groups from around the world. Furthermore, "the international attention this movement received served as a shield to prevent repression by the Mexican government" (Rucht, 2004, 42). As an early example of how activists were able to use online connections to sustain support and spread the word about the activities offline, the Zapatista movement represented the model for future coordination between real and virtual aspects of social change.

Postmes and Brunsting (2002) highlighted this coordination in an early assessment of the role of the Internet in a variety of forms of collective action, such as that of the Zapatistas. The authors cited Internet-based sites as key to supporting and organizing offline actions (2002). "It ap- pears that during the past decade the range of collective actions that we knew in the offline world has been complemented by online equivalents.

Hence, the Internet has the potential to support collective actions, but it remains to be seen to what extent this potential is widely put into practice" (2002, 292).

In their study of a group of activists and non-activists' attitudes and behaviors related to collective action, Postmes and Brunsting conclude that despite the fact that people use the Internet in isolation from others, it "would appear to exert a mobilizing influence, certainly on those who are ideologically sympathetic to the causes that are widely represented online, such as globalization and freedom of speech" (2002, 300). The authors suggested that the real influence of the Internet may be in the ways it is able to empower offline social movements that are created online.

Today we may be taking that observation for granted. When we study the role of online interaction in the organization of social movements, we assume that its importance is critical. Mercea (2012) decided to examine this relationship empirically in three specific ways: he wanted to know whether computer-mediated communication increased the number of people mobilized to participate in offline protests; whether the online environment allowed for increases in the new participants' identity with the protest organizations; and whether those who joined the movement online affected changes in how the movements were organized (2012, 154). He called the process of online participation leading to participation in movement activities offline "digital prefigurative participation." A key variable in this study was the degree of risk involved for offline participation.

In his study of two social movements (the high-risk Camp for Climate Action in Kingsnorth, Kent, U.K., and a low-risk protest festival—FânFest—in Romania), he learned that the use of the Internet by those unaffiliated with a movement led to their participation in offline events when there was little risk for them to participate. But when the risk was higher, the Internet was more frequently used by those already affiliated with the movement. Identity-building online was not a significant contributing factor to participation for those in low-risk situations (2012, 162), while it was a core value for the movement when the risk of participation was high, a commitment to social change was called for, and buy-in to the principles of the movement had often already been made. Contradicting the outcome of some other studies (Mosca, 2008), Mercea's study supports the "contention that mobilization into activism and the formation of a movement identity may largely hinge on unmediated socialization. Yet how sociality may be maintained or expanded through digital prefigurative participation is still an open question—and in particular in relation to increasingly popular Web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook" (2012, 165). His study was conducted prior to the time of widespread use of social media.

Identity building was central to the role social media played in the Egyptian uprising. According to research conducted by Aouragh and Alexander (2011) the opposition activists used the Internet as a place where they could build a case for a social movement against Mubarak and the Egyptian political structure. One of the dissidents, Noha Atef, interviewed by the authors, stated that his favorite method for online activism was to supply information to others that would make them angry about living under such a government. So once users had consumed the materials he placed online, they were ready to take to the streets because the information he provided had already made them angry (2011, p. 1348).

Studies of the Arab Spring uprisings in several Middle Eastern countries offered the opportunity to examine the role of social media in street protests across the region. In a study of the Tahrir Square protests by Tufekci and Wilson (2012, 369), the researchers surveyed 12,000 participants (yielding 1,050 valid surveys) in the Egyptian street protests. Most of the survey respondents were young, male, well-educated and had access to the Internet in their homes. Despite their high Internet use levels, almost half of the respondents had first heard about the demonstrations through face-to-face contacts, while another 28.3 percent received the first news from Facebook (2012, 370). Only very few respondents received the news from satellite television, radio or print media.

When the researchers evaluated the relationship between participation in protests held before Tahrir Square as well as those who were in the square on the first day of the demonstrations, they found some patterns of media use (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012, 375). Pre-Tahrir Square demonstrations were associated with use of print media, blogs, and social media for a range of information and print media and text messaging with information about the protests. On the first day of demonstrations, participation was associated with the use of blogs and Twitter for information and protest-related communication. Limited by the difficulty of collecting surveys during an active demonstration and therefore a lack of a random sample, the authors called for additional conceptual and empirical work to build on the "context and role of political communication, especially in authoritarian settings" (Tufeckci and Wilson, 2012, 376).

Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess (2013) also researched social media use in Egypt during the Arab Spring, comparing Twitter usage in Arabic and English in both the Egyptian revolution and the civil war in Libya. Although this "big data" hashtag analysis did not address offline participation in the two instances, the volume of tweets and the network interaction of those tweets indicated that social media played an important role in both revolutions. The authors state that one of the motivations for their study was to confront the popular narratives about the Arab Spring that overemphasized the importance of social media in influencing participa-

tion in the protest activity (see also Boulianne, 2015, 895). With respect to the use of Twitter in Egypt, they conclude that

> the substantial level of Arabic tweets in the case of #egypt certainly points to the fact that Twitter—and, by extension, other online media—did play a role in informing, organizing, and reporting protest activ- ities in the country (and most likely continue to do so now, as postelec- tion unrest persists), but this does not necessarily translate into support for the popular narrative of Egypt as a social media revolution.

Analysis of the Arab Spring from the perspective of Habermas's public sphere reaches a similar conclusion. Salvatore (2013, 219) argues that the use of social media in the Arab Spring has been overblown. Rather than being the determining factor in several social movements, social media are but evolutionary tools in a longer history of using media for revolutionary purposes. His examples of precursors to media used for dissent include the interactive approaches of Al Jazeera, founded in 1996, that allowed for people to call in their opinions on programs airing controversial perspectives, and the popularity of blogs that critiqued authoritarian regimes. He argues that we need a more balanced perspective when considering the factors contributing to revolutionary activity (see also, Lim, 2012; Harlow and Guo, 2014).

> Such a balance can be found first in acknowledging that in spite of the role of the tech-savvy young activists during several years of mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt, the networks that mattered most in the revolutionary events were not social networks like Facebook or Twitter. They were rather universities, mosques, trade unions, and, not least, football ultras, which had been active on the street since after the first eruptions and fought valiantly and effectively with security forces (Salvatore, 2013, 224).

GEZI IN EUROPE

What separates the research of the relationship between offline and online participation in social movements that confront government power, as was the case in the Arab Spring uprisings, from our own research is the geographical context of both the offline protests in the street or through public forums and the online protests in social media. All the research cited above was conducted in countries where the dissent against government decisions or actions took place (Egypt, Libya, Tuni- sia). In our research, the protests were located far from the center of the oppression, and the protestors may or may not have been actual citizens of Turkey.

Participants in the Gezi Park demonstrations reacted to the violent removal of the small group of environmental protestors camped in the small park, one of the few remaining green spaces in the center of Istan-

bul. They were there to protest the replacement of the park with a shopping center. Locating a shopping center in the park was a flash point for the environmentalists as recent years have seen a dramatic rise in the number of shopping centers being built in every part of the city. But it was the violent way in which the police removed the demonstrators from the park early on the morning of May 30 that prompted a full-scale protest by thousands of people who came to Taksim Square where Gezi is located. What began as a focused environmental protest grew into a movement against the Justice and Development party government of then–prime minister (and now president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Their grievances were many, including the increasingly authoritarian style of leadership, violations of rights of personal freedom, media censorship, and concerns that the secular government was being converted to one where religion and state were being merged. The movement spread from Istanbul to all the major cities in the country, and it took several weeks of a harsh government crackdown with massive police intervention and excessive use of water cannons, tear gas and plastic bullets to disperse the demonstrators.

In contrast, demonstrators in the three countries of our study—Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—had little to fear when they organized a number of street demonstrations in support of friends and family in Turkey. As they followed the news from Turkey and exchanged telephone and Skype calls, Facebook and email messages, and watched television from satellites or online broadcast from Turkey, they well knew the reasons for the protests and the reactions of the government. Living in the European countries with the largest population of ethnic Turks, the minorities organized events through new and existing organizations, planned street demonstrations, raised awareness in their schools and places of work, created Facebook pages, and began Twitter campaigns. And nobody stopped them, because in democratic Europe, all these activities were legal and supported by the European governments.

METHODOLOGY

In November 2013 through April 2014, we fielded a survey of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic minorities whose families emigrated to Europe from Turkey. Participants in the survey were either first generation immigrants or (grand)children of workers who left Turkey to make their homes in Europe. A large number of the respondents, who resided in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, were participants in some form of protest—in street demonstrations, in forums, in Facebook-based organizations created for protests, and in other social media such as Twitter. But just as in Turkey, a large number opposed the protests. Respondents were recruited to complete the questionnaire online through Face-

book and ethnic organizations we located in social media; and offline in predominantly Turkish neighborhoods where potential respondents lived, shopped and attended meetings of their organizations. Random sample drawing was not possible because of the nature and locations of the population, and no publicly available list of names and telephone numbers exists. Nearly one-third of the 967 respondents opposed the demonstrations in Turkey. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we focus on the supporters of the movement, or 639 of the respondents. Of those, 36.8 percent lived in Belgium, 27.5 percent in the Netherlands, and 35.7 percent in Germany. Females constituted 48.7 percent of the respondents and males 51.3 precent. The mean age of the supporters was 32.6 years. Fully three-quarters of the supporters were either attending university or had obtained one or more degrees. Although not included in this chapter, we also surveyed those who opposed the movement, or 328 respondents for a total of 967. We asked respondents whether they actively supported Gezi (by participating in protests or through social media or other ways), supported the movement (but did not actively participate), or were against the movement.

Online participation was measured by respondents' use of social media (Facebook or Twitter) to engage in the movement and by other online activities, such as recruiting others through social media, getting their information about the movement online, participating in activist online forums, and reporting increased use of Facebook and Twitter during Gezi. *Offline participation* was measured by demonstrating in the country where they lived, in other European countries or by going to Turkey to demonstrate.

Other offline activities measured were recruiting others face-to-face or on the telephone, participation in offline forums, getting their informa- tion about Gezi from television or newspapers, by increasing face-to-face interactions with other Turkish minorities in Europe during Gezi, by hanging the Turkish flag in front of their homes, and by participating in previous street protests related to Turkish anti-democratic policies.

The questionnaire consisted of sixty-four questions (including several multi-part ones). Respondents could complete the survey in Qualtrics online in multiple languages or offline in the language of their choice. Offline questionnaires were distributed, and often retrieved at a later date, at meetings of organizations, in headquarters of organizations, and at social gatherings in neighborhoods.

Assuming that offline participation requires more motivation and effort than online participation, we pose the following questions and hypotheses:

> Q1a: What was the nature of the online and offline participation in the Gezi social movement in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands?

Q1b: To what extent did participants engage in both online and offline activities?
Q2: What motivated demonstrators to participate in the movement online and offline?

The hypotheses are as follows:

H1a: Those respondents who strongly supported the movement in their country of residence offline will also report other movement-related offline activities more than online activities.
H1b: Those respondents who strongly supported the movement through social networks online will also report other online movement related activities more than offline activities.
H2: A wider range of issue-based motivations will be related to offline participation than online participation.
H3: A wider range of motivations for feelings will be related to offline participation than online participation.

FINDINGS

As expected from the recent literature on social movements, most respondents who participated in street demonstrations also used social media for protesting. We asked several questions about the degree of participa- tion in a number of areas—offline in the country where they lived, in public forums, in other European countries, in Turkey, and by hanging the Turkish flag in front of their homes. We also asked about the frequen- cy of attending events in public spaces in any geographic location. Sever- al questions addressed their online participation in the social media (Facebook and Twitter). When we correlated offline participation in the country where they lived with social media participation (both measured through 5-point Likert scales ranging from never to all of the time), the relationship was r= .22 (p=.000). In fact, about one third of the total number of respondents who participated both online and offline said they were engaged "all the time" in both ways.

There were differences, however. The correlations between participation in the country where they lived and other offline activities were much higher than those between social media participation and those activities: with the number of times they participated in public forums in the parks during Gezi (r=.44; p=.000 vs. r=.25; p=.000); participation in offline forums (r=.29, p=.000 vs. r=.25, p=.000); and participation in dem- onstrations in other European countries (r=.29, p=.000 vs. r=.19, p=.000). Some who demonstrated in their own European country also said they also went to Turkey to demonstrate (r=.26, p=.000) while there was a small significant relationship between social media participation and go- ing to Turkey to demonstrate (r=.11, p=.02) (See table 6.1).

Those who participated offline and online encouraged others to join the movement through social media, but that relationship was much stronger for the online participants (r=.53, p=.000) than it was for the offline participants (r=.24, p=.000). We also asked about the frequency of encouraging others to participate through a telephone or face-to-face connection, and both groups reported doing that equally (r=.35, p=.00 for both online and offline participants in the movement). Only those who participated in social media extensively defriended Facebook contacts who did not support the protests (r=.18, p=.000), however.

To test these relationships in a model (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), we used linear regression to determine whether heavily investing in other offline activities would predict participation in the streets during Gezi. We also used linear regression to determine whether those who partici- pated in a range of online activities, used the social media (Facebook and Twitter) to demonstrate online (See tables 6.2 and 6.3).

Online protesting during Gezi was significantly predicted by the use of Twitter as well as television for following the news on Gezi since the protest began, the amount of interest in Turkish life and politics since Gezi began, and the use of Facebook to encourage others to join the protest. Though several offline activities were positively correlated with online participation through use of the social media, none of the offline activities were significant predictors of social media participation.

Table 6.1.Protest Participation Online and Offline

	Offline Participation in Country of Residence (n=466)		Online Participation in Social Media (n=486)	
	r	sig	r	sig
Participation in previous street protests related to Turkey	.43	.000	.26	.000
Participation in public forums in the parks during Gezi	.44	.000	.25	.000
Participation in street protests in other EU countries during Gezi	.29	.000	.19	.000
Participation in street protests in Turkey during Gezi	.26	.000	.11	.000
Hung Turkish flag in front of home	.10	.000	.18	.000
Invited others to participate in person or by telephone	.35	.000	.35	.000
Participation in offline forums	.29	.000	.25	.000

Table 6.2. Predicting Offline Gezi Participation in the Country of Residence

	Beta	sig
Demographics		
Gender	.039	ns
Age	-.113	ns
Educational attainment	.026	ns
Length of time lived in the EU	.042	ns
Media Use		
Internet use frequency	.008	ns
Following Gezi on Facebook	.013	ns
Following Gezi news on Twitter	.070	ns
Following Gezi news on TV	-.049	ns
Following Gezi news in newspapers	-.40	ns
Activities		
Inviting others to join movement in person or through telephone	.143	.03
Encouraging others to join movement through social media	-.013	ns
Participation in offline forums	.082	ns
Became member of online activist discussion forums	.065	ns
Removed friends from social media networks who did not support protests	.026	ns
Frequency of participation in previous protests related to Turkey	.275	.000
Increased Twitter use during Gezi	-.020	ns
Increased Facebook use during Gezi	.051	ns
Participated in online activist forums	.065	ns
More interactions with Turks living in Europe than with others	.000	ns
Connections with people from Turkey living in Europe have increased since Gezi	-.097	ns
Attitudes		
View of Turkey as at risk during Gezi	.141	.04
Increased interest in life/politics in Turkey	.065	ns
Important issue in Gezi was media silence	.002	ns
Important issue in Gezi was conservative lifestyle imposition	.048	ns

R square = .28 Adj. R square = .22

The three significant predictors for offline protesting in the country where they lived were previous experience in street protests related to anti-democratic decisions or policies in Turkey prior to the 2013 Gezi uprising, having a feeling that the country was at risk, and inviting others by telephone or in person to participate in demonstrations.

Although the hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported, a number of the online and offline participation variables were unrelated to participation through the social media or in the streets (See tables 6.2 and 6.3). Further, demographic variables—gender, educational attainment, and age—were unrelated to patterns of offline activity, while gender and age were significant predictors of online activity. It is not surprising that younger, usually male respondents would make greater use of social media, however.

We expected that as in other studies related to determinations of online and offline activity that "the more the more" tendency would prevail (Ogan, Ozakca, and Groshek, 2008, 175)—in other words, if an individual had a tendency to perform one activity online, then that would lead that person to do a range of things online. But if that person was averse to conducting activity online, he or she would be more likely to perform those behaviors offline across a range of activities. And given that in social movements it has been shown that offline action is required for success (Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini, 2009; Harlow and Harp, 2012) **[AU: add to ref. list]**, we expected to see many more connections for a number of other activities.

DISPARATE MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE MOVEMENT

Previously we noted that the impetus for the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul was the government plan to replace the park with a shopping center. In recent years Turkey has experienced a shopping center building boom. At the time of the Gezi demonstrations, Istanbul had a surplus of shopping centers, and a debate was ongoing over how many more the city could support. The first mall opened in 1988 in Bakirkoy (on the European side of the Bosphorus), but by 2013, the country had 299 of them. Despite a plan for 100 additional shopping centers by 2015, twenty-four had already been closed based on a lack of business across the country, and eleven of those were located in Istanbul (Kömürcüler, 2013, June 1). The government plan for Gezi Park also called for the rebuilding of historical artillery barracks build by Sultan Mahmud II around the 1830s to be dedicated for social gatherings. It was reported that the rebuilt Ottoman-style barracks would be the actual location of the shopping mall in addition to a mosque, a baroque opera house and a space for other cultu-

Table 6.3. Predicting Online Gezi Participation through Social Media

	Beta	sig
Demographics		
Gender	.126	.03
Age	-.159	.01
Educational attainment	.087	ns
Length of time lived in the EU	.112	ns
Media Use		
Internet use frequency	.121	.03
Following Gezi on Facebook	.092	ns
Following Gezi news on Twitter	.224	.001
Following Gezi news on TV	.091	ns
Following Gezi news in newspapers	-.006	ns
Activities		
Inviting others to join movement in person or through telephone	.044	ns
Encouraging others to join movement through social media	.286	.000
Participation in offline forums	-.051	ns
Became member of online activist discussion forums	.065	ns
Removed friends from social media networks who did not support protests	-.006	ns
Frequency of participation in previous protests related to Turkey	.094	ns
Increased Twitter use during Gezi	-.114	ns
Increased Facebook use during Gezi	.156	.009
Participated in online activist forums	.065	ns
More interactions with Turks living in Europe than with others	-.018	ns
Connections with people from Turkey living in Europe have increased since Gezi	-.010	ns
Attitudes		
View of Turkey as at risk during Gezi	-.040	ns
Interest in life/politics in Turkey before Gezi	-.044	ns
Interest in life/politics in Turkey since Gezi began	.110	.04
Important issue in Gezi was media silence	-.055	ns

Important issue in Gezi was conservative lifestyle imposition	.131	ns
	R square = .38	Adj. R square = .32

ral events. The cultural center that currently exists in Taksim would be destroyed (as it represents Western-style culture to the majority party). While a mall would be a place for the public to gather, protestors claimed that the goal was to construct a commercial enterprise, not to preserve a green space for anyone to pass through or spend some time socializing or enjoying nature. The construction of a replica of the Ottoman-era building was also in keeping with the government's dream of recreating the Ottoman Empire through such symbols of past glory. Protestors viewed this decision as one that represented the government's view of the use of public space without consulting the people who live and work in central Istanbul.

The transformation of the park to a site for commerce was not the only grievance of the demonstrators who joined those in the park. Erdoğan had been elected prime minister three times since 2003, largely based on the economic success he had achieved in office, but also based on his appeal to conservative voters. As the years passed, his opponents had taken issue with a range of decisions deemed to be increasingly control- ling, unconstitutional, invasive of people's privacy, or supportive of a conservative and religious lifestyle. Political opponents criticized Erdoğan for his authoritarian style; accused him of moving ever more away from the secular state established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Republic's founder, toward an Islamic state; and were angry about his stranglehold on the nation's press through threats, prosecutions, and intimidation ("Turkey's Troubles," 2013, June 8; Aknur, 2014). Several other decisions made by the ruling party angered a portion of the public, who saw Erdoğan's leadership style as polarizing. This was not a new tactic for those in power in Turkey, but an approach that grew worse through the prime minister's tenure (Ete and Taştan, 2014, 24).

The growing anger across disparate groups with multiple agendas and causes came from different experiences, but in the KONDA survey taken in Turkey during the protests, the various issues coalesced in a single motivation for participating in the movement—to regain individu- al and group rights and freedoms in a democratic way through demon- strations in the streets (KONDA, 2014, June 5, pp. 34, 39). KONDA's study was conducted from June 6 to 8, 2013, in Gezi Park with 4,411 respondents, followed by a field survey in twenty-eight provinces of Tur- key among 2,629 respondents on July 6 and 7. The point at which the police attacked the demonstrators in the park was some kind of a trigger

for the respondents in the KONDA survey to physically join the movement.

In our European survey, we also asked about their reasons for supporting the movement. In addition to the issues that were prevalent in motivating the demonstrators in Turkey, we added issues that might be of relevance to the ethnic minorities living in Europe—such as drawing the attention of the European Parliament to the Gezi protests, feeling that the future of Turkey was at risk, and taking personal responsibility for addressing the situation in Turkey. Because our respondents, who made their homes in Europe, were not directly affected by the decisions of the Turkish parliament or by the attitudes and behavior of the prime minister, we expected them to be motivated to demonstrate for somewhat different reasons.

Hypothesis 2 regarding the motivations for strongly participating the movement online or offline was supported. The motivations for participation were different for those who frequently participated in offline activities and those who participated frequently through social media, however. We asked several questions (using 5-point Likert scales) related to the extent to which the respondents agreed with statements about the issues that prompted the Gezi Park protests. We interpreted strong agreement or agreement with the statements as motivating factors for the respondents' own participation. For those respondents who said they most frequently participated in the streets, many issues were positively and significantly related to the frequency of participation. The strongest relationships concerned the feeling that Turkey's future was at risk and the imposition of a conservative lifestyle on the Turkish people (See table 6.4). Of the thirteen issues we asked about, twelve of those listed in the questionnaire were positively and significantly related to the frequency of participation in offline activities.

However, for those who said they participated in demonstrations frequently through Facebook and Twitter, though all the motivations were positively related to online participation, only six rose to the level of significance. We interpret that to mean that much more commitment on a wide range of issues was required to drive people to participate offline, whereas less commitment to various causes for the movement motivated online participation. In the regression analyses, none of the motivations predicted online participation, but for offline participation, the feeling that the country was at risk was significantly related to demonstrating in the streets or elsewhere.

MOTIVATIONS FOR ONLINE/OFFLINE PARTICIPATION

Many of the stated motivations for participation in a social movement like Gezi are also emotionally charged. Some research has been con-

Table 6.4. Motivations for Participating Offline and Online in Gezi Protests in Europe

	Offline Participation in the Country of Residence		Online Participation through Social Media	
	r	sig	r	sig
Restriction on freedom	.16	.001	.07	ns
Authoritarian attitude of prime minister	.14	.002	.07	ns
Destruction of green spaces	.16	.001	.13	.005
Dysfunction of justice system	.12	.009	.08	ns
Media silence during protests	.14	.004	.01	ns
Feeling that the country was at risk	.20	.000	.12	.01
Imposition of a conservative lifestyle on the Turkish people	.20	.000	.21	.000
Protection of the principle of secularism	.12	.015	.121	.009
Use of violence by the police	.13	.005	.08	ns
Need for 10% election threshold to be reduced	.15	.002	.09	.03
Taking personal responsibility	.16	.001	.13	.006
To attract the attention of the European Parliament to the Gezi Protests	.10	.042	.04	ns
Support for the orientation of the association/political parties in which I hold membership	.04	ns	.01	ns

ducted on the role of emotions in social movements, but as Jasper (2011) points out in his review article on the subject, in the last two decades there has been an explosion in the literature that includes emotion as an important part of the research. Jasper observes that protestors were viewed as irrational or immature in the 1960s, but by the 1980s, a "distinct sociology of emotions had matured" (2011, 14). In Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans's research (2007), the authors write that emotions strengthen the movement by accelerating the action taken in a movement and amplifying those motives to join the movement. Citing several authors on the subject (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; and Leach et al., 2006), Stekelenburg and Klandermans cite anger as a primary motivator of protest movements, which when com-

bined with efficacy on the part of the participants leads to a normative action (2013, 893).

Efficacy may play a smaller role in online activism, say Earl and Kimpert (2011, 75), contradicting the belief of Postmes and Brunsting (2002). "We are not disputing that emotional motivators may matter at times, and for some kinds of web activism, but where five-minute activism is concerned we are contending that low participation costs are a large selling point and that lower amounts of efficacy may be required to agree to spend less than five minutes on an issue you care about." The authors speculate that the low cost to participation in a social movement online could change the degree of motivation a potential activist might need to contribute to the movement in the online environment—even suggesting that one does not need to be as angry to post a comment online as to show up for a street protest, and that it is possible that collective identity online may be minimal or perhaps not even necessary.

To be sure there was plenty to be angry about in the Gezi protests as depicted by the several motivations protestors cited as their reasons for taking to the streets or posting information and commentary online. We asked Gezi participants about several emotions they may have experienced, some related to collective identity, such as feeling they were altogether as a group, and others related to anger at the government for a range of policies. If Earl and Kimpert are right about the cost of the online activism experience related to the emotional levels required for participation, those who participated offline should have expressed higher levels of emotion than those who spent most of their time posting in social media.

That was not the case, however. In the questions related to feeling part of a larger entity and feeling a sense of identity, both online and offline participants expressed the same level of intensity (See table 6.5). When we asked about whether they felt strong together, the online participants' level of feeling together was about twice as strong as that of the offline participants. The online participants also claimed to have more fun or enjoyment in their experience (r=.245, p=.000 vs r=.058, p=ns). And nei- ther group felt they were at risk in their activity, while both felt they were in touch with the reality of the situation in Turkey. Both groups also felt a sense that they had fulfilled their personal responsibility to Turkey in their participation online and offline.

The results of this part of the survey indicate that online participation may well be more emotionally satisfying to the protestors than that of participating offline. This would support Earl and Kimpert's perspective on Web 2.0's effect on online activism, but does not support our third hypothesis that a wider range of feelings would be experienced by those who participated in public venues.

Table 6.5. Relationship between Offline/Online Participation and Feelings Related to Gezi Protests

	Offline Participation		Online Participation	
	r	sig	r	sig
Part of a larger entity	.284	.000	.270	.000
Feeling of an identity	.221	.000	.257	.000
Togetherness was enjoyable	.058	ns	.245	.000
Feeling of being at risk	.051	ns	.084	ns
We were strong together	.268	.000	.454	.000
Fulfilled responsibility to Turkey though I live in Europe	.185	.000	.207	.000
Pride in standing against injustice	.180	.000	.363	.000
Feeling I had little information about the reality in Turkey	-.054	.000	-.087	ns

EMOTIONS FELT ABOUT TURKEY BEING AT RISK

Much has been analyzed and written about social movements over the years. Before the Internet, and especially Web 2.0, research was focused on street-based demonstrations that required participants to show up in person. With the advent of social media, advocates of political and social causes can express their attitudes, provide information, and supply money to promote the continuation of the cause even if they never show up in person to add their voice to the crowd. This study has examined a social movement that took place more than a thousand miles from the site of the actual protest in the "squares" across Europe. Social media enabled the participants to keep current with events on the ground while ena- bling them to read and view video coverage of the ongoing activities. The affordances of social media allowed them to stay in constant touch with others across the European cities where they lived and across Turkey, where the violent uprisings were taking place. Perhaps it was the empathy they experienced with those who saw their personal freedoms being removed from them and being replaced with a set of policies that required a more conservative lifestyle. Perhaps they were watching as friends and family members were being beaten in the street protests. In this study, the strongest motivations for participation (online and offline) were the feelings that the country of Turkey was at risk and that a conservative lifestyle was being imposed on an unwilling public. These motivations were likely intensified by a range of images and video content available across the Internet. For those who demonstrated in public, a somewhat wider range of motivations led them there, illustrating the Earl and Kimport (2011) argument that much online participation comes at much

lower cost. Interestingly, however, the emotional basis for those motivations was stronger for those who participated online than for those who took to the streets. Earl and Kimport (2011) also argued that collective identity may not be so important in an online environment. This study showed, on the contrary, that no matter how they chose to participate, the demonstrators felt a strong sense of collective identity.

The study has also shown that those who demonstrate in the streets are also likely to prefer other offline means of expression, while social media users tend to stay online for various activities.

As with all such research with minorities, conducting a survey carries with it several limitations. The first was the inability to randomly select potential participants in the countries of our study. The second was the difficulty in recruiting individuals to complete the survey given the nature of the topic and the polarization among those who supported or opposed the anti-government protests. It is therefore hard to generalize from this study to other social movements in a diaspora population. In all, under the circumstances, it was a considerable accomplishment to get nearly 1,000 respondents to complete the lengthy questionnaire. We are hopeful that others can build on this work to learn more about the nature of social movement participation in other diasporic groups.

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